CONTEXTUAL- AND INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL DETERMINANTS OF POLITICAL TOLERANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES by Watkins, John
  
CONTEXTUAL- AND INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL DETERMINANTS 
OF POLITICAL TOLERANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
A Senior Scholars Thesis 
by 
JOHN DAVID WATKINS 
 
Submitted to the Office of Undergraduate Research 
Texas A&M University 
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the designation as 
UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH SCHOLAR 
April 2007 
Major: Sociology 
  
CONTEXTUAL- AND INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL DETERMINANTS OF 
POLITICAL TOLERANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
A Senior Scholars Thesis 
by 
JOHN DAVID WATKINS 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Office of Undergraduate Research 
Texas A&M University 
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the designation as 
 
 
UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH SCHOLAR 
 
Approved by: 
 
Research Advisor:      Robert Mackin 
Associate Dean for Undergraduate Research:  Robert C. Webb 
 
 
 
April 2007 
 
Major: Sociology 
  
iii
ABSTRACT 
Contextual- and Individual-Level Determinants of Political Tolerance in Developing 
Countries (April 2007) 
 
John David Watkins 
Department of Sociology 
Texas A&M University 
 
Research Advisor: Dr. Robert Mackin 
Department of Sociology 
 
 
 
Scholars of political tolerance have limited their investigations to the most developed 
democracies in the world, with few exceptions.  This research seeks to redress this 
shortfall by analyzing tolerance for civil liberties across democracies of varying stability 
and development.  To what extent do the explanations of tolerance derived from 
previous studies on developed states apply elsewhere?  In exploring this question, this 
study disaggregates the effects of national context from the characteristics of individuals.  
Data on individuals are drawn from the World Values Survey, a dataset which includes 
representative samples from dozens of nations.  Institutional, economic, and conflict 
intensity data from various sources are combined to test the impact of national context 
on tolerance.  As found in previous studies, age and education are strongly related to 
tolerance.  At the contextual-level, the intensity of recent armed conflicts is the best 
predictor of average tolerance across nations, even when controlling for political and 
economic attributes.  This finding contributes to the growing body of evidence citing 
threat as an antecedent of intolerance.  In this case the effect is especially surprising, as 
  
iv
the groups against which respondents chose to discriminate are generally not involved in 
the conflict. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS A SOLUTION TO THE PARADOX 
OF POLITICAL TOLERANCE 
 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali expressed the view of scholarly consensus when he wrote that 
democracy is not limited to the institutional framework that provides opportunities for 
citizens to decide the course of government, but democracy “also needs to be embodied 
in a culture, a state of mind that fosters tolerance and respect for other people, as well as 
pluralism, equilibrium and dialogue between the forces that make up a society” 
(2000:10). That is, democracy entails the institutions and attitudes that facilitate non-
violent conflict resolution and public decision-making.  An effective democratic political 
structure, then, requires some amount of toleration, insofar as it is a method for 
incorporating disagreement in a manner which encourages respectful coexistence among 
many groups wielding asymmetrical social power.   
 
Though tolerance is perceived as fundamental to pluralist democracy, scholars 
consistently find high rates of intolerance among citizens of the world’s most stable 
democracies (Stouffer 1955; Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus 1979; Mondak and Sanders 
2003).  Some take this as evidence that tolerance is perhaps not as important to 
__________________________ 
This thesis follows the style and format of Social Forces.
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democratic practice as previously thought.  Others have formulated theories that attempt 
to reconcile this ostensible contradiction. 1   
Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1979) posited that because individuals cannot agree on 
which group’s liberties to limit, what amounts to a coordination failure diminishes their 
ability to do anything at all.  Therefore, the frequency of tolerance is not as important as 
the distribution of intolerance across groups.  Sullivan and colleagues referred to this 
popular perspective as “pluralistic intolerance.”  There is still disagreement, however, as 
to what extent this theory is applicable to the United States.   
Whatever the underlying mechanism causing the disconnect between widespread 
intolerant attitudes and intolerant behavior, the fact remains that we do not understand 
tolerance well within even the most commonly studied nations.  Gibson (2006) argues 
that cross-national studies may help us reevaluate existing theories of tolerance and 
forge new ones in the process.  In doing so, we can discover which previous conclusions 
apply across countries of differing levels of development.  What is different in the less 
developed nations and what could account for any variation?  This study attempts to 
address this question, while disaggregating the effects of individual-level factors from 
those of national context.  Such delineation has not been possible in research pertaining 
only to a single country. 
 
                                                            
1 Karpov (2002) provides a succinct overview of the most prevalent theoretical perspectives for 
approaching the study of tolerance. 
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CHAPTER II  
ISSUES IN THE TOLERANCE LITERATURE 
 
Conceptualization and definitions 
This study investigates an issue that is spoken of often in politics, education, and the 
media.  Concepts often develop individualized, emotional, vague, and confusing 
meanings under such circumstances.  Tolerance is no exception.  The version of 
tolerance generally advocated is problematic for study, as there is no public consensus 
on what exactly it is.  
In the political discourse of the United States, tolerance can mean either 1.) hating a 
group, but not enough to harm them (a meaning encountered often in hate crime 
legislation); or 2.) allowing some amount of penitentiary leeway to violators of a law 
(usually found only in its negated configuration, as in ‘zero-tolerance’ drug laws). 
Because of the vague nature of the term as popularly defined, this study follows the 
tradition of separating the concept of “political tolerance” from its more emotionally 
invested progenitor.  The specific manifestation of tolerance important to the study of 
democracy and human rights is its role in shaping public understandings of the political 
process.  How do citizens of a country view social and political groups with which they 
disagree?  Would they allow these groups to participate in the same roles as a group that 
is considered more agreeable?  This conceptualization of tolerance is more amenable to 
research.   
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Students of political tolerance have found much more agreement as to what is important 
about this concept than the general public has.  Following decades of scholarly 
consensus, I will investigate political tolerance insofar as it is a representation of “the 
willingness of the citizens of a polity to extend the full rights of citizenship to members 
of a disliked, but legally-entitled political or social association.”   
Measuring tolerance 
The study of tolerance as it is known among scholars today began with the influential 
Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties by Samuel Stouffer (1955).  In the context 
of McCarthyism and a renewed “Red Scare,” Stouffer wished to discover differences 
between mass and elite tolerance, while gauging more generally to what extent 
Americans would be willing to deny the civil liberties of compatriots who identify as 
communists, socialists, or atheists.  Perhaps the most shocking finding of the study was 
that a majority of those surveyed was found to be intolerant toward the groups chosen by 
Stouffer.   
The pioneering Stouffer study laid the groundwork for future studies of tolerance in the 
United States and abroad.  So influential was his work that the same tolerance 
measurement technique is still utilized by the National Opinion Research Center for the 
General Social Survey.  This measure would guide decades of research until Sullivan, 
Piereson, and Marcus (1979) developed an alternative method, premised on the 
assumption that intolerance can best be inferred when individuals deny the civil liberties 
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of a group they particularly dislike, rather than groups chosen by the researcher.2  
Though the Stouffer technique is still used (Moore and Ovadia, 2006), scholars generally 
recognize the importance of establishing that individual affinities toward the group do 
not spuriously imply tolerance.  For example, if researchers ask individuals if they are 
willing to tolerate communists, respondents who identify strongly with that group are 
unlikely to provide intolerant responses.  These responses would be recorded as tolerant, 
but incorrectly so: the respondent simply did not have the opportunity to express 
intolerance.  For this reason, the “content-controlled,” least-liked group technique 
invented by Sullivan and his colleagues pervades recent literature on tolerance. 
The content-controlled measure of tolerance is especially important for comparative 
studies.  The salience of different group identities across national contexts complicates 
the traditional Stouffer method, as the researcher would have to select a group known to 
be equally controversial in each country in the study.  The least-liked group method 
standardizes responses by establishing that individuals are refusing to tolerate some 
group that is important to them, rather than one that the researcher considers important.  
For instance, we would not expect Azeris to be concerned about the Klu Klux Klan in 
any respect; nor would we generally expect Americans to have an opinion about 
Armenians.  Asking a question concerning the rights of either of these groups across 
dissimilar countries would only elicit arbitrary responses and significant error.  Because 
                                                            
2 Sniderman et al. (1989) and Gibson (1992) provide critiques of the new method.  Sniderman et al. 
disagree with the assumption that tolerance requires dislike, while Gibson finds that the results provided 
by the least-liked group method are largely equivalent to those of Stouffer’s technique. 
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of the vastly differing political and social priorities found globally, the present research 
utilizes the least-liked group to minimize measurement error when comparing across the 
international sample. 
Determinants of tolerance in developed countries 
I will test several individual-level hypotheses supported by past studies of the developed 
world.  First, educational level should be positively related to tolerance (Bobo and Licari 
1989).  Second, as others have found age to be negatively related to tolerance, I expect 
the same results in the international sample (Stouffer 1955; Sullivan, Piereson and 
Marcus 1982).  Finally, those who report preferences for freedom over order and support 
for democracy should be more tolerant than those who do not (Gibson 1986). 
The importance of tolerance to young democracies 
Only recently have studies begun to emerge that consider the importance of national 
context to tolerance (Gibson 2006; Hutchison and Gibler 2007; Karpov 2002; Marsh 
2005; Peffley 2003). What bearing does tolerance have on the economic and political 
development of younger states?  First, Social Identity theorists consider intolerance an 
important precursor to conflict (Gibson 2006).  Tolerance is therefore a potential 
safeguard against violence.  Furthermore, citing the work of Richard Florida, Moore and 
Ovadia (2006) argue that intolerance may have negative economic implications as 
innovation increasingly comes from the non-traditional creative class within cities.  
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Potential contextual predictors of tolerance 
As Gibson (1992) demonstrates, perceptions of freedom or the lack thereof can be just as 
important in determining action as government sanctions.  The belief that the 
government or other citizens will view an action unfavorably can severely curtail 
expressions of civil liberties, even in a superlatively free nation.  This implies a certain 
level of self-censorship that can cripple the exchange of ideas that allows for responsive 
democratic governance.  Through this process, intolerance functions at the individual, 
community and governmental levels to foster an atmosphere of conformity rather than 
expression.  The implications of these findings are important for young democracies 
which are attempting to establish the institutions and political culture that, at least, do 
not actively discourage dissent.  Contextual Hypothesis 1.) Because of the link between 
contextual tolerance and individual tolerance, I expect to find higher levels of tolerance 
where expression of political rights is freer.  
An economically successful nation and its populace should have more diverse 
possibilities for ameliorating conflict, such as litigation.  Because of this, it should be 
easier for people to settle disputes and work through differences.  Contextual Hypothesis 
2.) Economic development is positively related to tolerance.    
Large discrepancies in wealth distribution could lead to interclass conflict and have been 
shown to have negative impacts on democratization and regime stability (Muller 1995).  
I therefore expect to find a negative relationship between wealth equality and tolerance.  
Contextual Hypothesis 3.) Economic equality is negatively correlated with tolerance. 
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Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1982) found that perceptions of threat from a particular 
group decrease tolerance for the same.  Despite numerous subsequent studies confirming 
this link, little research has focused on the nature of these threat perceptions, as Gibson 
notes (2006).   All prior studies employ abstract threat ratings toward a particular group 
and at least one uses a threat measurement based on territorial threats (Hutchison and 
Gibler 2007), but no research has analyzed the effects on tolerance made by “actualized 
threats” in the form of conflict.  This lack of investigation is surprising, given that 
violence is perhaps the most alarming threat citizens face.  Contextual Hypothesis 4.) I 
expect to find lower levels of political tolerance among citizens of countries recently 
involved in intense combat. 
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CHAPTER III  
METHODOLOGY 
 
Individual-level variables 
This study analyzes aggregated secondary data from a variety of sources.  The dataset 
from which individual-level variables are derived is the World Values Survey (WVS) for 
the years 1995-1998 (Inglehart 2003).  The WVS provides one of the most thorough 
collections of global attitudes ever produced and includes several indicators of tolerance 
for unpopular groups’ civil liberties.   
Tolerance is measured through a set of questions in the WVS which ask respondents to 
what extent they would extend civil liberties to a group they dislike.  Respondents were 
first shown a list of unpopular groups and asked to pick the one they disliked the most, 
or to provide the name of some other more disliked group.  The list was devised using an 
understanding of each country’s political and social climate and were therefore well-
suited to different contexts.  For example, in nations in which religious affiliation is not 
as salient as ethnicity, it would make sense to include categories for ethnic groups rather 
than Jews or Christians.  The most commonly selected least-liked groups and the 
proportion of all respondents selecting each are displayed in Table 1. 
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Table 1: The Five Most Frequently Selected Least-Liked Groups 
Group N Percentage of Total
Neo-Nazis 8468 35.4%
Communists 3183 13.3%
Capitalists 1754 7.3%
Homosexuals 1637 6.8%
Immigrants 1332 5.6%
 
After choosing their least-liked group, respondents were asked if the group should or 
should not be allowed to hold public demonstrations, hold public office, or teach in 
schools.  Though eligibility for a teaching position is not usually considered a civil 
liberty, the rights of legally-entitled groups to earn representation and express dissent are 
at the heart of the democratic process.  Because the first two survey items most precisely 
quantify the concept of political tolerance as it relates to the distribution of democratic 
procedural rights, they were used to construct an index with a range of 0, indicating the 
respondent would disallow both activities by his or her least-liked group, to 2, indicating 
permission of both activities.  
Unfortunately, one of the answer categories offered to all respondents does not suit the 
conceptualization of tolerance used in this study.  The answer category “Criminals” 
poses several serious methodological problems, while also happening to be a somewhat 
enticing selection as a disliked group.  Everyone is intolerant of some type of criminal, 
though different thresholds for tolerable criminality certainly exist.  Indeed, intolerance 
for deviant or destructive behavior is the basis for systems of justice.  Additionally, 
convicted criminals often are not legally entitled to the same rights as other citizens.  
11 
 
 
This requirement is specified in the definition of political tolerance here employed.  
Finally, criminality is defined differently across cultures and nations.  There are issues of 
cross-national comparability when a vague category such as this is used.   
For all of the reasons above, it is illogical to try to measure political tolerance when the 
respondent’s least-liked group is “Criminals.” Respondents who chose this answer are 
therefore excluded from the analysis.  The elimination of these responses resulted in 
unacceptable data loss in many of the sampled countries.  Following the method used by 
Peffley (2003), I removed nations from the study which had fewer than 500 cases 
afterwards.3  The final sample includes 26 nations, 19 of which are considered 
developing.  Table 2 displays the final list of countries included in the analysis and the 
number of cases drawn from each. 
 
                                                            
3 An exception to this rule was made for New Zealand, which was short by three respondents.  The 
difference in sampling error between 497 and 500 respondents is negligible. 
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Table 2: Sampled Nations and Sample Sizes 
Country N Country   N 
Developed  
Australia 1524 Sweden 729
Germany 1564 Switzerland 707
New Zealand 496 USA 784
Spain 981  
Developing  
Argentina 605 Peru 895
Armenia 1347 Philippines 695
Azerbaijan 688 Romania 543
Bangladesh 1184 Russia 592
Brazil 522 South Africa 1318
Colombia 2759 Slovakia 502
Czech Republic 583 Slovenia 574
Georgia 1478 Ukraine 680
India 664 Uruguay 504
Mexico 1017 
 
The measurement problems do not end with the criminal category.  The WVS also 
included several other groups on the least-liked group list that are not legally entitled to 
the same rights as other citizens: narco-trafficants, terrorists, guerrillas, paramilitary 
organizations, and the Peruvian insurgent group Sendero Luminoso.  All of these groups 
are illegal wherever they operate and their inclusion may therefore contribute additional 
measurement error.  For example, of those who chose Sendero Luminoso as their least-
liked group (N=722), 96.5% would deny them the rights to hold office and demonstrate.  
The inclusion of the violent group Shiv Sena in India raises similar concerns.  As 
Sniderman et al. argue,  
“…it is intolerant to refuse to accept as legitimate a group merely because 
its ideas are different; it is by no means intolerant - indeed, it may reflect 
an effort to defend tolerance - to refuse to accept as legitimate a group 
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because its conduct is violent and illegal. To refuse to tolerate socialists is 
to be intolerant; but to refuse to tolerate terrorists is to be tolerant” 
(1989:42). 
 
To discover any differences due to the inclusion of these groups, I coded a variable 
corresponding to the legality of the chosen group.  The above were coded as 0 for being 
essentially criminal, while any other group was coded as legal.  Least-liked group 
legality and tolerance are very weakly correlated (r = 0.094) when excluding the 
“Criminals” category, leading me to believe the inclusion of these groups does not 
introduce significant error. 
These problems bring up a general issue with least-liked group measurement of political 
tolerance: individuals could have picked one of these or some other illegal group 
themselves by selecting the “Other” category.  A possible solution for future survey 
researchers is to make note of the groups that would otherwise go under the “Other” 
category, and to discard all illegal groups.  This should be done so as to exclude any 
value judgments on the behalf of the researcher.  If the group has collectively and 
verifiably broken national laws in the past or is by definition illegal, as in the case of 
criminals and terrorists, in what way could refusing this group procedural rights be 
considered intolerance rather than merely expressing the will of existing laws? 
In order to measure respondents’ support for democratic ideals, two items were selected.  
The first asked if government’s most important responsibility is to maintain order or 
respect freedom, coded as 0 or 1, respectively.  The second item asked the respondent to 
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what extent he or she agrees or disagrees with the statement “It is important to have a 
democratic system,” coded 0 – 4, strongly disagree to strongly agree. 
Education is difficult to measure across countries due to differing systems and average 
levels of attainment.  Luckily, the WVS provides an alternate educational level variable, 
recoded into low, medium, and high (0 – 2) categories based on researchers’ 
understandings of each country’s relative levels of educational attainment (Inglehart 
2003).  Age is also measured by a recoded categorical variable, ranked youngest to 
oldest, 0 – 6. 
As suggested by Mondak and Sanders (2003), a control variable was included to 
separate general prejudice from intolerance.  An item on the WVS asked respondents to 
select any groups which they would not like to have as neighbors, of a list including 
homosexuals, immigrants, and political extremists.  A discriminatory attitude toward all 
three groups is coded as a 0, indicating low willingness to accept diversity, and selecting 
none of the groups is coded as a 3. 
Because previous studies have found females to be somewhat less tolerant than males 
overall (Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus 1982), I control for gender in my analysis, as 
well.  Females are coded as 1 and males as 0.   
Contextual measurement 
National-level variables are derived from several different sources.  Freedom House 
publishes assessments judging the prevalence of government support for political rights 
every year for most nations of the world.  I use this assessment for the year of the WVS 
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in order to test the impact of a climate of free political expression on tolerance.  The 
political rights index measures the opportunities of people to participate freely in the 
political process, including “the right to vote and compete for public office and to elect 
representatives who have a decisive vote on public policies” (Freedom House 2006). 
Each country was scored between one and seven, with higher scores indicating a less 
desirable political climate.  
I test the effects of economic factors using data from the World Development Indicators 
database (World Bank 2006). Human Development Index (HDI), which is calculated by 
combining indexes of gross domestic product per capita, literacy, school enrollment, and 
life expectancy, indicates a nation’s level of development.  This variable ranges from 0 
to 1, where 1 is the highest score possible.  Wealth inequality is measured by the Gini 
index, where 0 is perfect equality and 100 is perfect inequality.  
In order to measure the impact of recent conflict intensity on tolerance, I incorporated 
data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program / International Peace Research 
(UCDP/PRIO) Armed Conflict dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002).  I recoded conflict events 
for the 3 years before World Values Survey administration into an ordinal variable with 
a range of 0 – 2.  A score of 0 indicates fewer than 25 battle deaths for the nation within 
the last 3 years, a 1 indicates between 25 and 1000 battle deaths, and a 2 indicates high 
intensity conflict of 1000 or more battle deaths. 
A multi-level model of tolerance 
Because I expect some amount of tolerance to be due to the grouping of respondents 
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within specific countries and because the data I analyze are multi-level in nature, I utilize 
Hierarchical Linear and Nonlinear Model (HLM) estimation.  HLM corrects for 
potential biases due to either of these factors by estimating separate variance structures 
for individuals within particular countries (Hutchison and Gibler 2007; Raudenbush and 
Bryk 2002). 
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CHAPTER IV  
RESULTS  
Table 3 displays HLM output for the 4 models designed to test micro- and 
macro-level hypotheses.  The dependent variable for all models is the tolerance index 
discussed earlier, which has a range of 0 – 2.  Model 1 tests the three individual-level 
hypotheses only. Models 2 through 4 add contextual variables in steps. 
 
Table 3: HLM Output for Micro- and Macro-Level Variables’ Effects on Tolerance Index   
Fixed-Effects Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 
Individual-level (N=23,935)     
    Female (1=Yes) -0.056** -0.056** -0.056** -0.056**
    Age -.0 016** -.0 016** -0.016** -0.016**
    Education 0.079** 0.079** 0.079** 0.079**
    Acceptance of Diversity 0.028** 0.028** 0.028** 0.028**
    Democratic Preference 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021
    Freedom > Order 0.048** 0.048** 0.048** 0.048**
 Contextual-level (N=26)  
    Political Rights -0.049** -0.084* -0.052
    HDI -0.482 -0.464
    Gini Index 0.002 0.004
    Conflict Intensity  -0.083*
Random-Effects  
    Variance Component 0.032 0.027  0.023 0.020
    % Cross-National Variance Explained 
         by Macro-model 
15.6% 28.1% 37.5%
    Chi-Square 2599.52 2195.49 1771.09 1602.597
    Degrees of Freedom 25 24 22 21
    Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: Entries are full maximum-likelihood coefficients estimated with HLM 6.02. 
* p < 0.05. ** p < 0.01. 
 
Education’s coefficient is statistically significant and positive (b = .079) as expected 
when controlling for all other micro-level variables, indicating that my first hypothesis is 
supported by the data.  As found in previous studies of developed countries, those with 
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higher educational levels are more likely to be tolerant than others.  The relationship is 
displayed in graphical form in Figure 1 below, with the dependent variable on the y-axis. 
Hypothesis 2 is also supported by the output, as age and tolerance are significantly and 
negatively related (b = -0.016).  This relationship is depicted in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The Effect of Education on Tolerance        
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The Effect of Age on Tolerance 
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The third hypothesis, which stated that support for democracy and a preference for 
freedom over order are positively related to tolerance, is less clear.  The first element, 
support for democratic governance, is not significantly related to tolerance, while the 
second part, a preference for freedom over order, is supported by the data (b = 0.048, p < 
0.01).  I assumed there would be significant overlap between these variables, though this 
is not the case.  Moreover, as the latter variable is coded dichotomously, its effect on 
tolerance when controlling for other factors is unimportant, even if it is significant. 
Model 2 tests my first contextual hypothesis, which supposed that those in nations in 
which political rights were better institutionalized would tend to be more tolerant.  This 
hypothesis finds support in the model, as the coefficient is significant and predicts the 
correct direction (since the index is negative).  The large decrease in the chi-square 
statistic with the addition of the political rights index indicates that it has accounted for 
some of the unexplained variation between nations and improved the overall goodness of 
fit (Hutchison and Gibler, 2007).  The political rights index remains statistically 
significant when controlling for individual-level and economic factors, but not when 
controlling for conflict intensity. 
The third model incorporates the economic factors hypothesized to affect political 
tolerance.  My second and third contextual hypotheses, which stated that economic 
development and equality, respectively, would be positively related to tolerance, are not 
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supported by the data.  The third model does, however, improve the fit of the model and 
explain some of the variation across nations. 
The final model incorporates all contextual- and individual-level variables.  Conflict 
intensity is statistically significant and negatively related to political tolerance (b = -
0.083), despite controlling for all other included factors.  This supports my final 
contextual hypothesis.  Furthermore, the inclusion of conflict intensity substantially 
decreases the unexplained cross-national variance.   Figure 3 displays the relationship 
between conflict intensity and tolerance graphically.  Figure 4 charts the relationship 
between education and tolerance across levels of conflict intensity, illustrating the 
intersection of the individual- and contextual-levels. 
Kreft and de Leeuw (1998) suggest a measure of the percentage of between-unit 
variance, or error, explained by successive multi-level models, calculated by the formula 
(Modeli variance – Modeli+1 variance) / Modeli variance; where i denotes the initial 
model.  Calculations for this measure are in Table 3.  The addition of the political rights 
index alone explains 15.6% of the variance in tolerance between nations; adding 
economic measures explains 28.1% of this error; and model 4, which includes conflict 
intensity, accounts for 37.5% of the between-unit variance.  This indicates that the final 
model explains a significant amount of cross-national variance, though substantial 
estimation error remains.  
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Figure 3. Conflict Intensity on Tolerance 
   
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Conflict Intensity and Education (X-axis) on Tolerance (Y-axis)  
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CHAPTER V  
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This research set out to answer two questions.  First, to what extent do theories derived 
from the study of tolerance in the most developed countries apply to other countries? Of 
the three hypotheses tested to investigate the applicability of existing theory, two were 
supported by the multi-level analysis above.  Across a large, international sample, older 
and less educated people tend to be less tolerant than younger and more educated people.  
Commitment to abstract democratic values did not appear to exert much influence on 
political tolerance. 
The second research question asked what contextual factors account for the variation in 
levels of tolerance across nations?  The analysis presented above indicates that recent 
conflict intensity is a robust predictor of tolerance, even when controlling for economic 
factors and the institutionalization of political rights.  This finding adds new perspective 
to a strong literature of threat as antecedent to intolerance, as this is the first to test the 
effects of “actualized threat.”  No causation can be inferred from this cross-sectional 
study, however, so we do not know if intolerance is causing conflict, or conflict is 
causing intolerance (or neither).  Fortunately, this does not diminish the importance of 
the theoretical linkage.  Considering that a negligible proportion of respondents chose a 
least-liked group even remotely related to the national conflict (recall that most selected 
Neo-Nazis or communists), the reduction in aggregate tolerance levels due to conflict 
intensity is especially staggering.   
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The limitations of this study preclude the separation of perceived threat to the state from 
perceived personal threat.  As Gibson (2006) asserts, the multidimensionality of the 
concept of threat needs further investigation.  This research has confirmed a new 
pathway for cross-national tolerance analysis, but much more needs to be done to fully 
understand the processes at work.   
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